

MEMORANDUM TO: Lieutenant General Lewis Brereton  
The Pentagon, Washington

SUBJECT: Proposal for Creation of a  
Secondary Air Reserve

You may recall our conversation in your office in the Atomic Energy Commission last June, and the suggestion that I made in which you expressed some interest. Working it out in detail for presentation proved to be a much larger task than I had anticipated, but the more I have worked on it, the more completely I am convinced that it is thoroughly sound and practicable.

While to most career officers portions of this proposal may appear revolutionary, I am hoping you will recognize in it traces of the schooling we received way back when you were a Major and I was a Captain in the Aviation Section, Signal Corps. I think all of us who had the privilege of serving on General Mitchell's original Staff in France acquired, both by example and by force of necessity, some of his pioneering style of thinking that will stay with us as long as we live.

Experience under General Mitchell was, as you remember, followed by that of organizing and operating the first Personnel Section for an American Combat Air Force, with all the problems and no precedents to follow. This was followed by ten years as Lieutenant Colonel in that Reserve which gave me an opportunity to observe the workings of that organization. During World War II my contacts with the Air Force were wholly informal; first with the Pentagon, in connection with the organization of the Air Force Casualty Section, and later with the XII Air Force in Africa, Italy and France, and the XV Air Force in Italy, in connection with casualties or intelligence. In a year and a half overseas with the OSS I had a first-hand opportunity to observe the development and functioning of a new type of military organization that was as much a pioneer in World War II as the Air Service was in World War I. What follows is therefore based on a combination of Air Force background, OSS experience, and civilian viewpoint.

Stated briefly, I am outlining a plan under which the Air Force could inexpensively convert what is now little better than a vast library of biographical information into a large secondary reserve of trained personnel that could be quickly and effectively utilized in any type of war emergency that might conceivably develop.

While I have no knowledge of General Staff thinking, I assume the modern version of the old Plan Red must envisage a new kind of two-front war with one or more external fronts and an internal front presenting a whole new series of problems with which we have had no prior experience. These undoubtedly include the possibility of limited airborne invasion, the probability of partial paralysis of our nerve centers of communication, and the certainty of well organized subversive activities, plus "X" factors that would seriously handicap our internal organization for defense. National survival might conceivably require an effort, not only far in excess, but carried out under far more difficult conditions than anything we can now visualize.

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It must be assumed that the Air Force might have to develop a vast program of expansion under the double handicap of limited time and adverse conditions. To meet this situation they should be in position to quickly and effectively utilize to the fullest extent the services of any individual who, by reason of training, special skills or experience, would be of immediate value in emergency. To assume that an enemy would allow the time and opportunity for the development of conventional training programs such as we had in the last wars would be the most dangerous sort of wishful thinking. Carefully prepared training plans might have to be shelved and replaced by extemporization. Skillful and full exploitation of existing trained air man power resources might well be the margin between victory and defeat.

There is now in existence an immense reservoir of such personnel, trained in World War II and now returned to civilian life. But, except for the minority incorporated in the Organized Reserve and the National Guard, there is, so far as I can find, no plan for quick and effective utilization of their services in emergency.

It is recognized that combat personnel deteriorates rapidly with age but numerically they constitute only a small proportion of a modern Air Force. Ground Personnel, which contains equally high skills and makes up the bulk of the Air Force, deteriorates slowly and for this generation World War II experienced individuals will have a definite, though steadily diminishing, military value. The hundreds of millions of dollars spent in training them has already been charged off as part of the cost of the last war and whatever value might be realized in the future from their training and experience is additional return on an old and almost forgotten investment. Measured in terms of man hours required to train equivalent new personnel the value of this investment is now locked up in the filing cabinets of the Personnel Section. By the application of a fairly simple three-step process this "biographical morgue" could be reconverted back into living human beings, willing and capable of quickly rendering valuable service in any war emergency.

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*is beyond calculation*

The first step in the process would be the most difficult because it would involve acceptance by the Air Force of a wholly new concept of personnel. Under this new concept qualified civilians could be used interchangeable with military personnel at all levels in non-combat organizations. The precedent has been partially established through the use of civilian employees in the lower levels. It might also be noted that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force himself reports to a civilian Secretary and a civilian Commander-in-Chief. In the last war a rather awkward subterfuge was adopted under which scientists and others whose services were needed but who could not be commissioned, were given "simulated rank". I am now proposing the civilian, who has heretofore been considered only as an appendage, be incorporated as an integral part of the wartime military structure. Now that they have been freed from the shackles of the past, I propose that the Air Force establish a wholly new personnel category for the non-career civilians, so designed as to facilitate their quick incorporation and efficient utilization in war emergency.

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This new category should probably be divided into "working levels" or "levels of responsibility", paired with the corresponding military rank or grade. Establishment of intermediate levels between the major levels might give added flexibility. Base pay and allowances would probably, although not necessarily, be identical with the corresponding military grade but none of the future benefits associated with military service or with career government service would accrue. The "working level" of former military personnel called in for emergency service would bear some relation to former military rank but would be determined more specifically by the "level" of the particular assignment. Command functions would not be inherent but could be assigned the same as in military rank.

This new category should be built new from the ground up and not be considered as an adaption or modification of the present civilian employee status which would be left unchanged. With a few exceptions it would be reserved for mature individuals, normally employed in private industry who, as part of their obligation as citizens would, in time of need, put the national interest ahead of their own. The civilian "working levels" would be in no way a simulation of rank but would carry within prescribed limits the same responsibilities.

The use of qualified civilians directly in the chain of command was proven to be wholly practical by the OSS. Many of their largest divisions containing substantial numbers of military personnel were commanded by civilians. Others, commanded by commissioned Army or Navy officers, used civilians at various subordinate levels of command. No serious administrative or disciplinary problems appeared to develop. This was a particularly severe test as their operations were being carried on in the war zones and the civilians generally were lacking in military background. It should be particularly noted that I am suggesting the use of individuals in this category only in domestic installations and in those operations that have counterparts in industry. With some exceptions, these individuals will have a ready-made background of military training and experience.

The major advantages that would accrue to the Air Force through the extensive use of this new category in emergency might be summed up as follows:

- (1) The time-saving feature would be tremendous. A civilian can be called in and put to work in a matter of hours as against weeks that may be required by the cumbersome process of selecting, examining and issuing a Presidential Commission to an officer.
- (2) Authority to call in and assign individuals in civilian status can be delegated to any level of command. This would eliminate dangerous bottle-necks at top level command points, which only the most optimistic would expect to function normally under the conditions of the next war.

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(3) Dismissal would be simplified. The stigma associated with removal of the uniform in war time makes it difficult to remove an officer and the process is laborious. Headquarters at all levels tend to become cluttered with officers who, in the interest of efficiency, should be eliminated to make way for advancement of more able juniors. The mature non-career civilian, working on a war time assignment, is motivated primarily by the idea of getting the job done and getting home and termination of his services, for whatever reason, offers no complications.

(4) Standards for Commissioned Officers could be higher. Ready availability of the "civilian assignment" would eliminate the necessity of commissioning individuals whose services were needed as specialists but who lack the overall qualifications expected of an officer. An ultimate development might conceivably be the gradual limitation of conventional military rank to career officers and to those Reservists, National Guardsmen and others whose duties were strictly military in character.

(5) The field from which human material could be selected in war emergency would be vastly widened and improved. The Army's reputation for putting the square peg in the round hole would deter thousands of former service people from re-enlisting or applying for commissions, but those same individuals would unhesitatingly accept a definite "civilian assignment" which they were qualified to fill. By application of the established principles of job analysis, concentrating only on the qualifications necessary for the particular assignment, and generally disregarding other considerations, the field for selection is broadened and the efficiency level can be raised.

Even if no further steps were taken than to get this new category set up and to make the necessary provision for its use in emergency, the mobilization potential of the Air Force would be tremendously increased. A modern war-time Air Force has become an immense aggregation of technical and industrial specialists which can no longer be successfully compressed into the rigid framework of the conventional military organization where uniformity has always been the prime objective. In the next war organizational tidiness must be subordinated to productive efficiency.

Once the means for quick and effective utilization of his services has been established the next step in the process is to set up the machinery that would make the individual immediately available when he was needed. Because of the longer training and higher experience required in their specialties, certain individuals and groups would have greater value in emergency than would the mass. These groups should have first consideration and other classifications would follow in order of their "urgency rating". A few thousand, or even a few hundred, specialists in certain classifications might be more valuable than many times that number in the less specialized groups. Airplane motor mechanics of "crew chief" caliber might, by this yardstick, have a higher rating than many officer classifications. No new classifications would be required but simply a re-grouping of existing classifications on the basis of estimated urgency of need in emergency.

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The law of diminishing returns would determine how far down the list of classifications it would be practical to proceed in the actual incorporation of individuals into the organization. This should be worked out on a selective basis, both as to classifications and, to some degree, as to individuals within the classification. Once the "urgency rating" of the various classifications have been established the breakdown would be largely a mechanical process which, with the existing card recording system, could be handled inexpensively and rapidly.

After it has been determined that a given group is to be incorporated in the secondary or, as it might better be known, the "Special Air Reserve", the problem becomes one of locating the individual and keeping track of him once he has been located. This again is a purely clerical, largely mechanized, process. The Air Force will have in its files the current addresses of some of its former personnel, but I assume that they have lost track of most of it, particularly the former enlisted men. Numerically, they will constitute the largest and possibly the most important group. The co-operation of other government agencies could be enlisted in bringing these files up to date. The Insurance Division of the Veterans Administration maintains the current addresses of between five and six million former members of the Armed Forces. Other divisions of the Veterans Administration maintain current contacts with other hundreds of thousands. Should the Veterans Administration prove reluctant to afford this co-operation it might be pointed out that the American taxpayer, who is paying the bill, is the one in whose interest the National Defense program has been developed. The Post Office Department already has a service through which, for a penny a name, the commercial mailer keeps his lists current and even a higher degree of co-operation could be expected by the Air Force. The "urgency rating" of his classification would determine how much effort may justifiably be expended in locating a given individual.

As you have probably noted, this proposed Special Air Reserve adopts some features from the European rather than the American concept of a reserve organization. Under the European concept any person having military training is automatically maintained as a member of some reserve organization. His personal wishes are not consulted. Under the American concept the initiative is left entirely to the individual. It is assumed that, unless he is willing to commit himself unreservedly in peace time to full acceptance of all the obligations of war time military service, he is not reserve material. Under existing conditions this concept is unrealistic as it overlooks a far larger number of trained men, particularly from the enlisted grades who, though unwilling to formally obligate themselves far in advance, would be available should the need for their services actually arise.

In the organization of this Special Reserve I am proposing that the Air Force proceed on the assumption that, if a given individual is not a member of a military organization but has qualifications that would give him particular value to them in emergency, he is ~~per se~~ reserve material and should be incorporated in this reserve. The Air Force would take the initiative and select in advance the material they have reason to believe they would want, both as to classifications and individuals.

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Because he is not being asked to make any commitment, the selection can be made without the consent of the individual and even without his knowledge. The compulsory feature of the European reserve concept is replaced by a well-founded assumption that the mature American called in to fill a particular assignment in a war emergency is not likely to refuse. Mathematically the ratios are favorable as the Air Force needs and the percentage of response by individuals will both be in direct proportion to the gravity of the emergency.

The following are the general groupings that, in my opinion, should constitute the backbone of the Special Air Reserve:

1. RETIRED REGULAR AIR OFFICERS

Maintenance of high morale and efficiency in a modern Air Force necessitates frequent infusions of new blood at all levels of command. It follows that senior officers are retired at an age that, by old Army or even corporate standards, would be called young. "Turning them out to grass" while they are still mentally and physically capable of rendering service is a waste of valuable military brains and experience. The capabilities that brought them to top command posts, combined with wartime command experience, would seem to have value that should not lightly be put aside. It would be tragic from their own as well as from the country's standpoint, to force these men to sit out a war on the sidelines simply because no means has been worked out to utilize their services. While precluded from re-entrance into service with military rank they could, at a corresponding civilian "working level", render highly valuable service.

With respect to this particular group I would go still further and propose that, even in peace time, in lieu of retirement and complete separation from service, they be transferred to the Special Air Reserve, reactivated at the appropriate "civilian level" and kept right on working. Relieved of details of command responsibility and able to devote their time to top level planning, instruction, industrial contacts, liaison, and innumerable other activities in which their experience and prestige would give them high rating they could still render most valuable service. On retirement many from this group have taken positions in industry and there is no justifiable reason why they should not continue to work for the Air Force where their specialized knowledge and experience would give them the most value. From the standpoint of a taxpayer it would seem that the difference between retirement pay and continuation of active pay in this new category is an insignificant sum in proportion to the value of the knowledge and experience it would buy. With the means at hand of conserving the valuable services of these men, the present rapid promotion policy could even be accentuated.

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## II. FORMER RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL

The greatest detriment to reserve efficiency is stagnation. That was proven between wars and it is again becoming manifest in both Organized Reserves and National Guard, in the enlisted grades as well as officer ranks. To maintain interest and efficiency, top levels must be ruthlessly cleared, regardless of ability, to make room for advancement of junior officers. This is a poor reward for conscientious reserve service. Creation of this new category would provide the means by which higher level reservists, both officer and enlisted, could be "graduated" into the Special Air Reserve. Their services would still be available in emergency and their interest in the Air Force would be maintained. If properly encouraged, they would assume a large part of the initiative and responsibility for building up the Special Air Reserve in their own areas.

## III. POTENTIAL COMBAT PERSONNEL

Reactivation in emergency in this new category would provide a ready means by which former combat personnel could be incorporated, tested and even given some re-training. If proved unsuitable they could be returned home without complicated Board action and without the "loss of face" that would be entailed if they were dropped from military service in war time. Qualifications could be determined by actual performance prior to issuance of commission. Individuals unsuitable for combat but satisfactory for instructor, transport and similar activities, could be retained in the new civilian status.

In addition there are now many thousand young men who had pilot's training under the G.I. Bill of Rights. Much of this training is, from a military standpoint, a liability rather than an asset, and under normal conditions, the Air Force would prefer to take new material and start its own training "from scratch". But under the emergency conditions we are assuming shortages of time and material may necessitate a modification of this policy. The investment of millions has already been made by the taxpayer through the Veterans Administration. Whatever the Air Force can salvage from it comes to them without cost, either in dollars, materials or training time. By the law of averages these millions of hours of training cannot have been wholly wasted and must have uncovered some talent. Because it is actually in existence this must be considered as Air Force mobilization potential and for economic, if for no other, reasons the Air Force should be in position to exploit it in emergency. This group, or at least those who have shown the most promise, could be incorporated as part of the secondary reserve. By re-activation in emergency and a rapid screening process the salvageable value of this training could quickly be recovered and utilized.



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#### IV. FORMER GROUND OFFICERS

Given the necessary qualifications and proper authority, any former ground officer could perform the same functions in a civilian capacity that he was capable of performing as an officer. With the possible exception of top command posts, most domestic air installations could, in emergency, be entirely staffed with ex-military personnel functioning in civilian capacity. This would automatically free military personnel for duty with combat organizations. The same type of personnel could be used in emergency as fill-ins for non-combat duties in combat organizations.

#### V. PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL PERSONNEL

By enlightened application of this new category in the medical field the Air Force could, in war time, have their pick of the ablest medical and surgical talent in the country. Individual practitioners could be given civilian "working levels" commensurate with their standing in their own specialty and still report for administrative purposes to a regular medical officer of a military rank correspondingly lower. Freed from the administrative responsibilities that cannot be separated from military rank, these individuals could function far more efficiently in their own specialties. By further study it should be possible to develop a fairly simple method through which the services of high level specialists could be utilized on a fractional basis when and as needed, in peace time as well as in war time. Medical organizations at all levels would co-operate whole-heartedly in any plan which would increase military medical efficiency.

#### VI. FORMER PERSONNEL OF OTHER BRANCHES AND SERVICES

The new Air Force would, it is assumed, have to supply its own Signal, Quartermaster and similar personnel formerly trained and furnished by other branches. High quality trained personnel in these specialties might be in short supply in any large general expansion of the Armed Forces. Unless actually a member of the reserve organization of their own branch or service, nothing prevents their incorporation in the Special Air Reserve. Navy trained air mechanics, Radar and other usable specialists, not members of the Naval Reserve, need not be barred. The problem of locating and incorporating them would be somewhat greater, but in those specialties having a high "urgency rating" the additional effort might be justified.

#### VII. WAR TRAINED FORMER NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

This is unquestionably one of the most important of the groups mentioned. The shortage of trained specialists and mechanics of "crew chief" qualifications would probably prove one of the most serious personnel bottle-necks in an Air Force expansion program. The lack may even now be one of the serious deficiencies of Reserve and National Guard organizations. Millions of dollars went into the training



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of these men and the value of their experience can be measured only in hundreds of millions. No amount of peace time training can even approximate the value of the experience that they gained from maintaining airplanes in the field under conditions of actual air warfare.

As differentiated from flying personnel, their war-acquired skills do not deteriorate rapidly with age. A good crew chief at 25 would still be a good crew chief at 35 or even at 45. In some instances their skills have been improved by their subsequent civilian employment. Equipment has not changed so much that a few days' "refresher" under war conditions would not bring them back to the peak of their war-time efficiency. The Enlisted Reserve has little to offer and it is a safe assumption that all but a small percentage of this tremendous investment is now lying loose around the country with no existing plan for quickly reclaiming it in emergency.

Properly organized, this group could in emergency (a) form the "mechanical backbone" of a greatly expanded Air Force; (b) temporarily fill gaps in Reserve and National Guard organizations; and (c) provide a reservoir from which trained military personnel could be recruited for service in combat organizations.

#### VIII. FORMER ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Skills, experience and training carrying a high "urgency rating" would have the same values in this group as in the others already mentioned. It must not be forgotten that maturity and subsequent civilian experience might have increased the value of many individuals to a point well above that shown by their military record. As a per man cost of incorporation and maintenance in this reserve would be trifling it might, for reasons that will be shown later, be desirable to include it in larger numbers of former enlisted men that at first sight would appear necessary.

#### IX. CIVILIANS WITHOUT PRIOR MILITARY EXPERIENCE

In previous groups stress has been placed on prior military, and particularly Air Force, experience of the individual because (a) his complete record is available; (b) means of locating him are at hand; and (c) he can be quickly and easily fitted into the military structure with which he is already familiar.

This last group has none of these assets and an individual would be included only if he had special qualifications to offset the disadvantage. But it still might be a very large group. Technicians and specialists would head the list. To it might be added a large group who perform no direct military service but who, for no

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seemingly sound reason, the Army has always seen fit to incorporate as military personnel. This includes Public Relations Officers, Recreation Officers, Post Exchange Officers, and many others who could, in most cases, perform their functions more efficiently out of uniform than in. Certain intelligence functions distinctly fall in this classification. As will be pointed out later, the incorporation of these individuals would be at the local or regional level.

As a preliminary to a more detailed discussion of the form of organization this Special Air Reserve would follow reference should again be made to the nature of the emergency for which it is designed. In the past military plans were based on certain hypothetical situations that, on the basis of intelligence information and known factors, could be outlined with some degree of accuracy. That no longer holds. Military planning must now be broadened to include the unforeseen and the wholly unexpected. It can no longer be predicated on a stable civilian basis. It must include the likelihood of an initial enemy strike implemented with new and potent weapons, and new techniques aimed at the civilian foundations rather than the military superstructure. It might assume a situation under which it would be necessary to develop a high mobilization potential on a civilian foundation that may have been completely destroyed in spots and crumbling in others. As citizens we have placed full confidence in our military establishment and, in turn, they must accept full responsibility for functioning well and efficiently under any eventuality, foreseeable or unforeseeable.

To be in position to fully meet such a situation the Special Air Reserve should be set up on a regional or area basis, without over-dependence on centralized command or on other regions or areas. It should be able to place in the immediate disposal of the regional Air Command, or lower echelons, substantially all of the available trained air man power resources of the area, without regard to what may be transpiring in other parts of the country.

The geographical division of the country might follow the lines already established by the Air Force for other purposes or they might follow new lines designed to fit the particular requirements of this type of organization. Subdivision could follow straight geographical lines, or still better, could be tied in with established Regular and potential Reserve and National Guard installations. As air manpower resources are in direct ratio to density of population, metropolitan areas would require different treatment than predominantly rural areas. The ultimate goal would be to carry the breakdown to a local unit, limited by both area and population which could, except in emergency, be administered by a single individual as an un-compensated reserve service. This phase of planning would require careful studies by a staff group familiar with Air Installations with some knowledge of Air mobilization plans. The quality of the reserve would depend entirely on the quality of the staff work that goes into it.

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Like that of all other regular military establishments, the primary concern of the regular Air Force has always been with the development of striking potential. The development of mobilization potential always has, and probably always will, receive only secondary consideration. To insure the development of this new reserve, and at the same time to avoid putting additional burdens on the regular Air Staff, it would be my recommendation that the Staff be composed of the first group mentioned, i.e. retired regular Air Officers reactivated in the new civilian status. General Arnold or General Spaatz or other former high ranking Air Force Officers, now in retirement, or others soon to be retired might be given this assignment. Their broad knowledge of Air Force organization and planning and the prestige their name carries with the men who served under them would be valuable assets. But because this would be fundamentally a civilian organization the top level planning staff should also include individuals whose viewpoint would be predominantly civilian.

In its initial stages the organization could be wholly centralized, preferably at some secure point outside Washington. Personnel records would still be available for their present use. With modern mechanical record-keeping, only a small amount of regular clerical and statistical personnel would be necessary. Once the staff had been set up and the process of breakdown by classification had been started the organization would have a definite "going value" capable of immediate utilization should an emergency develop. Each day's operation would add another increment to this going value.

Regional or area headquarters might, or might not, coincide with established Air Command Headquarters. Ideally they would be located at an established Air installation carefully chosen with respect to location, transportation and communication. Physical facilities should be adequate to permit conversion overnight from a single room containing a few filing cabinets to war time requirements of a large personnel section.

Permanent regional personnel requirements would be small but should be chosen with extreme care. Top responsibility should probably rest with an ex-career officer with high command experience as, on the outbreak of hostilities, he would be in virtual command of unmobilized personnel probably very much outnumbering these mobilized in the area. The successful operation of the reserve program would depend on the degree of integration previously established between the regular Air reestablishment, the Special Reserve, the Organized Reserves and the National Guard. The pioneer stages would, therefore, require organizational ability of a high order.

Command of the local unit should be delegated to carefully chosen reservists, preferably ex-regular officers or "graduated" from the Organized Reserves or National Guard, so as to assure integration at these levels. At that level "personal" should definitely be put in "personnel". The local command should be well-informed both as to the emergency air man power requirements and to potentialities, both in gross and, to some degree, by individuals. As it is assumed he would work without compensation, he should not be overburdened with detail. Complete personnel records would necessarily be maintained at this level and skeleton records on the regional level. For psychological as well as other reasons, sub-division headquarters should probably be placed at well-selected local airports. The most logical plan of

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development would be to establish test areas for intensive organization and, by trial and error methods, establish a pattern which could quickly be put in effect on a national scale should an emergency appear imminent.

At this point careful consideration should be given to an incidental but extremely valuable by-product that could be developed from this form of organization. Anyone who had any experience around the Pentagon in World War II, and will project that experience into World War III conditions, will realize that, at the outbreak of hostilities, all Air Force Personnel Sections would be inundated by a tremendous flood of applications for re-commissioning and re-enlistment which they would be wholly incapable of properly handling. Even under favorable conditions they would be hopelessly bogged down. Under the plan I have outlined this flood could be held back at the grass roots. By immediate action of regional or local Special Reserve commands, these applications could be diverted to the local level and, on the basis of the personnel records there, could be properly screened. Through the integration previously established with Regular, Reserve and National Guard organizations they could, from the local pools of applications, be furnished with the best grade of available personnel in the classifications wanted, when and as needed, and with minimum movement. As part of routine war planning the Personnel Section must be seriously concerned with this tremendous problem, which would be piled on top of other problems developing on the outbreak of hostilities. The solution offered here should warrant careful consideration on their part. It is conceivable that the value of this one by-product might justify a large part of the administrative cost of the whole plan.

If the plan was carried no further than this point, the announced purpose of converting obsolete World War II records into a readily usable reserve would have been fully accomplished.

By adding one step the striking potential, as well as the mobilizational potential, could be markedly built up. In peace time a large percentage of the regular Air establishment is engaged in operating schools, depots, airfields and other fixed installations. In lack of arrangements for their quick replacement, at the outbreak of hostilities, the regular personnel engaged in these activities would not be available for duty with combat organizations. By matching the personnel requirements of such an installation against the air man power resources in the tributary area it would be found that nearly, if not all, of the important classifications could, in emergency, be filled from the Special Reserve of that area. The military personnel could be released for combat duty. Such suitable combat personnel could be under actual orders to report, in emergency, to designated combat units, and their "opposite numbers" in the Special Reserve could be ready to step in and take their places. If the proper degree of co-operation had previously been developed between the Regular Air installation and the Special Reserve commands at the unit levels, only a small fraction of the Regular Air Force need be pinned down in war by "garrison duties". The same means could be used for notably increasing the striking potential of the Reserve and National Guard units.

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This means of indirectly augmenting the striking potential of the Regular Air Force could be developed much further by a joint education program at the unit levels. Specialists in these groups whose services would be in particular war time demand could be invited in to regular installations, with no strings attached, for demonstrations of new equipment and new techniques. Those showing particular interest might be given further instruction, without at any time being required to make any definite commitment. Particularly qualified members of the Special Reserve of known availability might even be definitely instructed in the duties they might be called on to assume in emergency. This should involve no appreciable cost.

A difficult part of the joint program would be in the education of the Regular Air establishment both as to the possibilities and to the methods under which the Special Reserve would be used in war time. Their thinking would have to be re-oriented to a point where they ceased to think of themselves as "The Air Force", but rather as one segment of the Air Force having certain special responsibilities, one of which was the indoctrination and education of the Reserve elements, including the Special Reserve. Key personnel in the Special Reserve must be made to feel that they are actually a part of the Air Force.

There is also the possibility of organizing, in well-populated areas where there is no military Air installation, complete primary training centers of such other installations that might be needed in a rapid Air Force expansion. These would be strictly "paper" units and would involve no cost but might prove extremely valuable in emergency. As in prior cases, certain "test" areas should be selected for initial experiment and the fullest encouragement should be given to local organizational talent.

Except in the case of key personnel and those pre-selected for specific assignments, no direct contact need be established with the individual. If his record or other information shows he has the desired qualifications and he has no military obligation of higher priority, he is automatically placed in the Special Reserve. He is not consulted as to his wishes. The only factor considered is usability to the Air Force in emergency.

If carried to the limit of organizational perfection the individual would, at the unit level, be classified by both usability and availability. "Usability" would be determined by (1) the "urgency rating" of the classification to which he belonged (2) his ability as shown by his military record, and (3) the nature of his post-war employment, as it might effect his war-acquired skills. "Availability" would be determined wholly by the nature of his present civilian employment in its relation to the whole program of defense. A high "usability rating" might be nullified by a low "availability rating". A former air officer currently engaged in selling shoes would have a high "availability rating", whereas if he held an important position in the aircraft industry it would be very low. It would not be necessary, or probably even desirable, to depend on the individual as a source of information about himself. Local Credit Bureaus usually have fairly complete employment information which could probably be obtained gratis for this purpose, or for very small cost. State and Federal Employment agencies could be used in some cases and still other means are available

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in most communities. It is not assumed these refinements of organization would be applied on a nation-wide scale but they should be carefully worked out in experimental areas ready for immediate and wide application, should the necessity arise.

Mobilization of individual members of the Special Reserve would be accomplished at the unit level, when and as needed, by means of the direct "call". The individual is called in for interview; sufficient reference is made to his record to show why he was selected; and he is told where and what service is wanted from him. Release from present employment is secured for him where necessary. It can be presumed that some successor to War Manpower Control will be available which would enable the Air Force to exercise some control over the civilian, the same as any war industry, but such control, even if available, should be used sparingly. Personal considerations which may render the individual wholly deaf to mass appeal can usually be quickly disposed of by an able interviewer. The percentage of refusals would be small.

This technique was very effectively used in the last war by the OSS (as I can personally verify) and by other organizations in the recruitment of scientists and other specialists. In war emergency a request for his services coming from proper authority, directed personally to the individual, has the impact of an Act of Congress.

Military thinking, which is geared to the battlefield, and is always in terms of direct command, may have some difficulty in adapting itself to the new concept on which the organization and utilization of this proposed Special Air Reserve is based. But now that the battlefield has become only one segment of warfare, the military must free themselves from dependence on the direct command and in these other segments apply the principles of Personnel Management which will prove far more effective. Since the Air Force is no longer obligated to blindly follow ground force traditions this should not be too difficult.

This proposal should be carefully studied from three separate viewpoints. The first viewpoint should be that of the Air Force. From that viewpoint it should be determined whether the development of this Special Reserve would, as claimed, directly and considerably increase trained mobilization potential and, indirectly, raise striking potential.

The second viewpoint to be considered is that of the taxpayer to determine whether, in proportion to other military costs, the dollar spent on this reserve would yield 100 cents of value, measured in terms of National Defense. As the cost would be wholly administrative and confined to regional levels and above, the unit cost would be lowered as the size increased. Once it had been set up to somewhere approaching maximum strength, I believe unit costs would be kept well within a 1 to 100 ratio, or, inversely, 1000 individuals could be maintained on the Special Reserve basis at the cost of one average individual in the regular establishment.

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The third, and possibly most important viewpoint to be considered, is that of the potential enemy. Viewed from the inside, the purpose of strong peace-time military establishment is to be ready to fight and win a war, if and when necessary. Viewed from the outside, its purpose is to keep us out of war, maintaining at the same time our national prestige. An underestimation of American military potential encouraged two European aggressors to start two World Wars. It is distinctly in our National interest to keep their present successor from making the same mistake. Through his well-organized intelligence he is able to accurately evaluate our Regular, Reserve and National Guard strength. He knows, as does everyone else, that what was the world's largest and finest Air Force, was disbanded after V. J. Day. If he had reason to suppose that a substantial percentage of these war-trained veterans, for whom he has the highest respect, were being maintained on any form of reserve basis, it might be a strong deterrent to any contemplated hostile action. Because it would be difficult to evaluate this new "X" factor it would seriously complicate his intelligence problem and he might even overrate its value, which would be wholly desirable.

As it is assumed to be good strategy to give a weak position the greatest appearance of strength, the creation of this Special Reserve might be particularly helpful at this time in bridging the gap that will exist until the Air Force can be built up to authorized strength. The impression of strength could be accentuated by rigorously classifying all top level information and allowing to leak out only such information as A2 might desire. The fact that the organization was built on a new and strictly American pattern could be exploited as a point of strength. In the present world situation the propaganda value of an additional reserve, numbering, if wanted, anywhere up to 2 million men, should not be overlooked.

The basic idea of organizing the existing trained Air man power resources of the country into some quickly usable form of reserve is, without question, fundamentally sound. As this proposal expresses the viewpoint of only one individual it certainly can be improved. I hope any person having occasion to study it will conscientiously endeavor to maintain a positive viewpoint and suggest modifications and improvements, and avoid the easier course of offering merely negative criticism of details.



## Better Late Than Never

The accompanying proposal was submitted to the Air Force nearly two and one-half years ago. Gen. Vandenberg's acknowledgment read, in part, as follows:

"Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg has transmitted to me your proposal for the creation of a Secondary Air Reserve. Your plan has been studied by the Air Staff with considerable interest and has been found to be an outstanding example of creative thinking. As a new concept, it offers wide areas for detailed study."

A year later the same proposal was submitted to the Department of Defense with the suggestion that, instead of being limited to the Air Force, the plan outlined could be advantageously applied in the creation of a Unified Technical Reserve, functioning directly under the Department of Defense, to provide an emergency reservoir of technically trained personnel for all three branches of service. Acknowledgment, received through the Munitions Board, read, in part, as follows:

"As you are aware, your plan has far-reaching implications for manpower planning for the whole economy. It is being studied by the different staffs within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A fuller reply will be made as soon as all staffs have an opportunity to study it in the detail it obviously merits."

The emergency, which this plan was designed to meet, now appears to be rapidly taking shape. But, because this plan involves a deviation from the age-old dependency of the military on the direct command as its sole means of accomplishing a given result, it is doubtful whether the Department of Defense will ever, on its own initiative, give it serious consideration.

Because the crisis we are now facing is something wholly new in our history it seems obvious that a new concept should be developed to meet it. In hopes it may stimulate thinking along new lines - and possibly achieve some direct result - I am sending copies of this proposal, just as it was originally presented to the Air Force, to 100 individuals both in and outside the government.

As a bare minimum I hope to direct attention to the existence of a vast reservoir of war-acquired technical skills, representing an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars, which - for want of some plan for its utilization - is being allowed to go to waste in our time of greatest need.